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the American deficit, national debt, 
and entitlements, and the occasional 
departures into partisan rhetoric do 
not really serve the overall thrust of the 
book. Some of the arguments it contains 
are inconsistent or undeveloped. An ex-
ample is the suggestion to build smaller, 
single-mission hulls, which is followed 
later by a diametrically opposite 
recommendation to build multimission 
frigates with antiair, antisubmarine, 
and antisurface warfare capabilities. 
Additionally, his proposal to relegate 
much of the Army to National Guard 
or Reserve status is probably politically 
infeasible because of the dire effects this 
would have on the communities around 
major Army bases. All that aside, it is 
difficult to disagree with the fundamen-
tal tenets of Mayday—that a sufficiently 
sized and equipped Navy is crucial 
for our continued national security 
and the maintenance of international 
order—and on these bases his arguments 
for a naval expansion are sound.
Mayday provides an excellent case for 
reversing the piecemeal downsizing of 
the Navy, a return to pragmatic platform 
design, and consistent funding of a 
shipbuilding program to deliver and 
maintain a fleet sized to secure our 
interests and achieve our international 
objectives. Although the quote is not 
mentioned specifically, this book recalls 
President George Washington’s observa-
tion in his letter of 15 November 1781 
to the Marquis de Lafayette: “[W]ithout 
a decisive naval force we can do nothing 
definitive, and with it, everything 
honorable and glorious.” Mr. Cropsey’s 
recommendations are pragmatic and 
worth consideration by senior Navy 
leadership and policy makers alike.
JOSH HEIVLY
Realpolitik: A History, by John Bew. New York: 
Oxford Univ. Press, 2015. 408 pages. $27.95.
John Bew, a historian at King’s 
College London, provides the first 
comprehensive intellectual history of the 
often-misunderstood term Realpolitik. 
Drawing on the experience gained 
from his acclaimed biography of Lord 
Castlereagh, the Napoleonic-era British 
foreign secretary, Bew traces Realpolitik 
from its obscure, nineteenth-century 
origins in revolutionary Germany to the 
term’s use and misuse in contemporary 
Anglo-American foreign policy debates. 
Scholars and practitioners seeking to 
gain a more nuanced understanding of 
the evolution of Western foreign policy 
thinking over the last century, particu-
larly before 1945, would be well advised 
to consider Bew’s compelling narrative.
In the often-glib foreign policy 
discussions that characterize public 
understanding of the discipline’s key 
terms and points of contention, realism 
is often supposed to be interchange-
able with Realpolitik. Bew’s greatest 
contribution is his voluminous research 
into the term’s early history, beginning 
with the 1853 book Foundations of 
Realpolitik by the little-known German 
philosopher Ludwig von Rochau. This 
original formulation, distinct from 
later uses in both Germany and the 
Anglosphere, was a creature of its time 
and place: a disunited Germany torn 
between the liberal impulses of the 
1848 revolutions and the conservatism 
of its traditional ruling class, as 
personified by Otto von Bismarck.
Rochau’s Realpolitik was not an ideol-
ogy at all; it was a lens for viewing the 
political circumstances of Germany’s 
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bourgeois liberals at a time of conserva-
tive reaction. Rather than continue to 
build “castles in the sky,” as Rochau 
believed the failed revolutionaries of 
1848 had done, he argued for a specific 
focus on the essential truth that ideas 
have little currency without some 
acquaintance with power. To have any 
hope of success, Germany’s liberals had 
to understand the underlying social, 
economic, and political context of how 
power was wielded and the limita-
tions that existed on their freedom of 
action. A fervent believer in German 
unification for liberal ends, Rochau 
supported much of Bismarck’s foreign 
policy under the guise of Realpolitik. 
A sober appraisal of the domestic 
political situation meant that German 
unification, even under the leadership 
of a reactionary conservative such as 
Bismarck, provided the best long-term 
prospects for German liberalism.
It was Rochau’s unsentimental ac-
ceptance of the facts of the situation, 
as he interpreted them, that defined 
the original Realpolitik. Bew’s essential 
mission is to chart the course from 
Rochau’s relatively benign concept to the 
fraught foreign policy debates of today, 
with intermediate stops in Wilhelmine 
and interwar Germany. In his zeal to 
demonstrate the laudable breadth of 
his research on the term’s multicentury 
evolution, Bew occasionally overwhelms 
the reader with quotes and anecdotes 
from relatively obscure academics whose 
opinions of Realpolitik and its various 
permutations have only tangential 
relevance. His point, seemingly inargu-
able given the clarity of Rochau’s writing, 
is that the term quickly lost its essential 
benignity and was co-opted by German 
intellectuals advocating something 
very different from Rochau’s cold-eyed 
analysis of the facts on the ground.
Realpolitik’s introduction to British and 
American audiences at the beginning 
of the twentieth century was in a far 
different form. Namely, after Germany’s 
nationalist academics transformed the 
term into an amoral ideology of “might 
makes right,” Anglo-American opinion 
came to regard it as a synonym for 
German militarism and ultranational-
ism. Bew is particularly elegant in his 
parsing of Rochau’s original work and 
the contrast with much of the ultra-
nationalist proselytizing that came to 
define Anglo-American understanding 
of Realpolitik before the First World War.
Bew’s narrative shines particularly  
brightly during his analysis of the 
interwar period, notably the use of 
“Realpolitik” by British prime minister 
Neville Chamberlain to justify his 
appeasement of Nazi Germany. The 
counterreaction to the perceived failures 
of Woodrow Wilson’s liberal internation-
alism precipitated a reappraisal of the 
term in London during the 1920s and 
1930s, with it coming to be seen more 
positively as a steady adjustment to facts, 
as opposed to Wilson’s starry-eyed ideal-
ism. Bew, seeing the appeasement debate 
as a critical node in the term’s evolution 
to its ultimate place in the twentieth-
century realist paradigm, is convincingly 
dismissive of Chamberlain’s co-option 
of the term. Quoting at length from 
contemporary sources, Bew notes that 
Chamberlain’s Realpolitik lacked many 
of the essential elements of commonly 
accepted foreign policy realism and 
instead relied on a world-weary pes-
simism that left Britain unprepared for 
the Nazi challenge. Winston Churchill’s 
blend of tactical realism, in the form 
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of advocacy for a British rearmament 
policy, and ideological opposition to 
Nazism serves as a powerful contrast to 
Chamberlain’s flawed use of Realpolitik.
Bew breaks less original ground in 
the post-1945 period, as Realpolitik in 
the postwar United States is decidedly 
intertwined with the much-discussed 
“realist” school of foreign policy 
exemplified by academics such as Hans 
Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz. The 
term’s Germanic origins and use by 
discredited proponents of the Second 
and Third Reichs undoubtedly contrib-
uted to a period of limited use, even by 
self-proclaimed realists. Bew’s narrative, 
post-1945, begins to merge into the 
broader discussion of the different 
schools of American foreign policy that 
emerged during the Cold War—an area 
of much previous research without room 
for the compelling scholarship offered 
in this book’s early chapters. Like all 
who study “realism,” Bew is drawn to an 
extended meditation on Henry Kissinger 
and his influence on U.S. foreign policy. 
Refreshingly, Bew is cognizant of the 
subtlety and nuance of Kissinger’s world-
view and refuses to paint that enigmatic 
figure with an overly broad brush.
Realpolitik: A History is an important 
contribution to international relations 
scholarship, not least for resurrecting 
Ludwig von Rochau and the origins of 
Realpolitik. Bew is to be credited with 
tracing the term’s evolution in multiple 
countries with different political cultures 
with relative ease and skill, showing time 
and again the slow metamorphosis of the 
term into something far different from 
what its creator intended. Particularly 
in the interwar appeasement debate, 
Realpolitik found itself misused toward 
ends that were anything but realist. More 
broadly, the term has been twisted to 
mean any policy that is believed to lack a 
moral foundation or, from the contrary 
viewpoint, is seen as grounded in realis-
tic levelheadedness. As Bew’s narrative 
ends and the term is gradually subsumed 
into the broader tradition of American 
realism, the reader is reminded of the 
inherent flimsiness of the structure of 
so many of the terms endemic to the 
debate over American foreign policy. 
Professor Bew’s new book is a helpful 
antidote to such rhetorical laziness.
ALEXANDER B. GRAY
Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice, by Wil-
liam C. Martel. New York: Cambridge Univ. 
Press, 2015. 548 pages. $115.
“The main goal of this book,” Martel 
writes, “is to provide contemporary 
policy makers and scholars with a 
rigorous historic and analytic framework 
for evaluating and conducting grand 
strategy” (p. ix). Acknowledging that 
the term itself is “relatively new,” 
although its concepts certainly can 
be found throughout history, Martel 
credits academics during World 
War II (particularly “the founder of 
modern grand strategy, Edward Mead 
Earle”) with being the first to focus 
on a nation’s “highest political ends,” 
employing all elements of national 
power—“diplomatic, informational, 
military, economic”—to achieve global, 
long-term security goals (pp. 23, 25, 30). 
He thus elevates grand strategy above 
“strategy,” “operations,” “tactics,” and 
“technology” while acknowledging that 
for most of history “strategy”—how to 
achieve overall military victory—was 
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